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P.J. DROOGLEVER
The Genesis of the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1949
Since Independence, Indonesia has had three constitutions,1 The first one 
marked the beginning of the conflict with The Netherlands, and at the same 
time the birth of the new Indonesian state. The nascent Republic of 
Indonesia formally accepted this constitution on 18 August 1945, one day 
after its proclamation of Independence (Nasution 1992:461-7), It had been 
drawn up under the aegis of the Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigative Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence), or BPUPKI, in the final months of Japanese 
military rule. In keeping with political thinking in Indonesia’s colonial past 
and present, it left ample room for authoritarian practices.
For the Dutch, who were eager to reinstall their government apparatus 
in Indonesia after 1945, the birth of the Republic represented a fa i t  
accompli that was difficult to digest. After ample deliberation, however, 
they went so far as to publicly accept the principle of Indonesian 
independence (NIB 111:703-8), although they were definitely not prepared 
to give up Lheir interests in Indonesia unconditionally, nor did they accept 
the Republicans’ claim that they were speaking on behalf of the whole of 
the population. They therefore encouraged the creation of separate 
political entities from the Republic. Thus four years of armed conflict and 
protracted negotiations were to pass before the conflicting parties finally 
came to an agreement about the structure of the new state and its 
relationship to The Netherlands.
On 27 December 1949 the formal transfer of sovereignty from The 
Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia took place. 
The previously prepared provisional constitution (Nasution 1992:469-504) 
of this newly created federal state immediately came into force. This
1 This article is a slightly altered version of a paper presented at the 13th Conference 
of the International Association of Historians of Asia in Tokyo in September 1994. 1 
am much indebted to Theresa Stanton for correcting the English of an earlier version.
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constitution -  Indonesia’s second -  provided for democratic procedures, 
the protection of human rights, and, of course, the division of power that 
was so essential for the functioning of the federation as a whole.
Constitutional change did not stop here. Sovereignty had been 
transferred not to the Republic that had proclaimed its independence in 
1945, but to an Indonesian federation, of which the Republic was the most 
dominant, though certainly not the only member. At least four other well- 
defined states, together with eleven political entities with a more fragile 
structure, formed part of it. With the retreat of the Dutch army, however, 
the force that had supported this federal construction disappeared from the 
Indonesian stage. The component states of the federation subsequently 
crumbled away one after another as the result of a mixture of intimidation 
and free will.
On 17 August 1950 the unitary Republic of Indonesia rose from the 
ashes again. This time it was equipped with a constitution which was in 
essence a revision of the constitution of 1949, with the federalist elements 
left out. This 1950 constitution (Nasution 1992:505-28), the third in suc­
cession since the Proclamation of Independence, remained in force until 
1959, when it was replaced with the 1945 constitution as a result of the 
rather high-handed intervention of the upper army echelons and President 
Soekarno (Nasution 1992:397-401; Lev 1966). Soekarno’s guided demo­
cracy clearly needed simpler rules for the wielding of power.
That is how Indonesia came to have three constitutions up until the 
present day.
This article will focus on the backgrounds of the second of these 
constitutions, the one whereby the United States of Indonesia gained 
formal independence in 1949.1 shall go into the discussions that led to its 
final formulation, and give attention to the place occupied by this consti­
tutional debate in the power game between the Dutch and their Indo­
nesian allies and adversaries, as well as to the key factors that helped to 
bring about the final result. This constitution was drawn up at a time when 
the Dutch still had a say in the conduct of Indonesian affairs. One might 
ask, therefore, who were the men who contributed to its formulation. Was 
it a purely Indonesian affair or was it dictated by Dutch ghost writers 
acting either openly or behind the scenes? The answers to these questions 
can help us gain a deeper understanding of the decolonization process in 
Indonesia, which gained momentum after Japan laid down its arms. They 
may also serve as a modest contribution to the long-standing debate 
between so many in the West and East, including persons in positions of
power in some Asian countries, about the universality of democratic 
values.
Before surveying the constitutional debates of the post-1945 period, it 
would be useful to take a closer look at the main constituent body of the
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Republican State of 1945, the BPUPKI. This body was composed o f over 
60 members chosen by the Japanese military government from among the 
more senior nationalist leaders and officials. There was no room in it for 
anyone who had not wholeheartedly cooperated with Japan. The social 
democrat Sjahrir, for instance, who surely was one of the most prominent 
pre-war leaders of the nationalist movement, had no seat on this committee. 
The Islamic Masyumi party was rather meagrely represented on it as well. 
During the meetings of the committee, strong pro-Japanese voices were 
often heard pleading for continued cooperation with Japan in its struggle 
against the invading Allies.2 Nevertheless, it seems to have comprised a fair 
and quite representative sample of the pre-war secular nationalist leaders. 
Most prominent among them were Soekarno and Hatta. Conspicuous roles 
were also played by legal experts such as Professor Supomo and Muhamad 
Yamin. A fundamentally different choice of members probably was not 
possible for the Japanese authorities. Yet the Dutch, when they returned 
from abroad or were released from Japanese internment camps, found it 
especially difficult to accept these men as the true representatives of 
Indonesia because they had sided with Japan.
It is not easy to present a clear picture of the sentiments prevailing at the 
meetings of BPUPKI and its short-lived successor, the much smaller Panitia 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian 
Independence), or PPKI, which passed the first Indonesian constitution on 
18 August 1945. Proceedings are only available for part of the discussions. 
The various committee members played widely different roles, as may be 
deduced from the very different lengths of the speeches of each, varying 
from a few minutes to a full hour. It makes sense, therefore, to examine the 
longer speeches of the more prominent figures, such as Soekarno’s still 
famous exposition of the foundations of the Indonesian state, the Pancasila 
(Bahar et al. 1995:63-84). Very important also was the related debate 
about the place of religion in the new state, only in the last round of which 
it was agreed to leave out a passage explicitly making the rules o f the 
Syariah binding on the followers of Islam. Also worthy o f note was 
Professor Supomo’s plea for an ‘integrated’ state (Bahar et al. 1995:31- 
43). He rejected individualism and Western liberalism outright as being 
unfit for Indonesian society. Referring to the German ‘FUhrer-Prinzip’ and 
to Japanese Shintoism, among other things, he staunchly defended the 
concept of the state as one big family. It was not the interests of any 
particular individual or class of people that constituted the essence of the 
state, but the unity between the leaders and the people. Democracy was 
welcome, but should be interpreted in this light. Not a majority voting 
system but the principles of musyawarah (mutual consultation) and 
mufakat (consensus) were to constitute the modus procedendi of Indo-
2  For the latest and most complete publication of the minutes of these meetings, see 
Bahar et al. 1995.
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nesian democracy.3 Farther worth noting was the discussion about the 
form the new state was to take, A decided majority of 17 speakers pro­
fessed itself to favour a unitary state. Nevertheless, there were five 
speakers who pleaded in favour of some kind of federation to do justice to 
the enormous variety of the Indonesian insular world.4 This plea was to be 
heard again in later discussions held under Dutch auspices.
The task of committing the actual draft for a constitution to paper was 
delegated to a small committee chaired by Professor Supomo, who is thus 
rightly styled ‘the father of the Indonesian Constitution’. This draft was 
passed by the PPKI on 18 August 1945 after a brief discussion (Bahar et al. 
1995:423-41; Hatta 1982:458-63). It can be described as a rather rough 
blueprint of the new state. This was envisaged as a unitary republic based 
on the principle of sovereignty of the people. Nevertheless, to begin with, 
all power was placed firmly in the hands of a President, who, assisted by a 
Vice-President, was to appoint the ministers. In addition, a Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council) with rather vaguely 
defined powers in the fields of legislation and budgeting was provided for. 
As Supomo explained, the President and the Council should try and work 
together according to the principle of musyawarah. Their respective duties 
were described in such a way, however, that the President possessed the 
right of initiative. Even fewer powers were enjoyed by the provisional 
representative council, the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, or KNIP, 
which was in operation in the period before elections were held and the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and other organs of state convened for the first 
time. This KNIP was to have only advisory powers. It was expected to ‘be 
of assistance' to the President. No rules were drawn up regarding its 
composition, but the President, in consequence of the scope of his powers, 
had the right to appoint its members and to lay down the basic rules of 
political life. The preference of the first President, Soekarno, was obviously
3  Supomo’s remarks, as Bahar rightly points out, were made at a time when Japan 
was still in power in Indonesia. Even so, there is no justification, in my opinion, for 
playing up the 'fascist1 element in Supomo’s thinking at the time. The opposition 
between priority of the rights of the individual versus those of the state or society as a 
whole was and still is one of the central issues of political philosophy. It must be 
borne in mind, moreover, that Supomo, as a professor at the Batavian Law School, had 
published on the relation between the two in Indonesian customary law, which 
certainly did not correspond to the concepts of Western liberalism (Supomo 1983). 
Even in the discussions under the supervision of the Japanese military administration, 
Supomo did not go so far as to defend the precedence of the will of the leader in so 
many words. For the present study it is important to note, however, that Supomo gave 
more prominence to the concept of leadership in the discussions about the 1945 
constitution than he proved himself prepared to do in 1948, In both cases he was 
providing an eloquent example of ‘berpikir secara kontekstuaU indeed (Bahar et al.
]995:XV1II; see also Simanjuntak 1994: passim).
4  For a summary of the discussions see ‘Indonesia Merdeka Selekas-Lekasnja\ a 
copy of which is kept in the Algemeen Rijks Archief (A.R.A.), The Hague, archief 
Algemene Secretarie van Ned.-Indie 45-50, 5647.
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for an outright presidential system combined with a one-party state.
On these two points Soekarno soon met with stiff opposition from the 
leaders of the various political movements in the young Republic, 
however. As far as they could see, the one-party system threatened to curb 
their freedom and smacked too much of the recent fascist past. They seized 
their opportunity in October and November 1945, when, with the Allied 
troops in Java, the need for a change of leadership became evident. After 
something of a palace coup, the idea of democracy was now given 
prominence: more parties were allowed to organize themselves and the 
KNIP was to become the first legislative body. A smaller body, the Badan 
Pekerdja or KNIP Working Committee, was instituted, which would con­
vene more frequently, thus making it easier for it to function permanently 
as a legislative body (Hatta 1982:472-4). The President’s role was reduced 
to a mainly symbolic one, while real powers of government were placed in 
the hands of a cabinet chaired by a prime minister. Indeed, in the ensuing 
years of revolution, the cabinet asked the Badan Pekerdja’s assent in most 
important matters, and it accordingly came to act as a provisional parlia­
ment. This had its limits, however. When agreement could not be reached, 
the President did not hesitate to use his prerogatives as defined in the 
transitional provisions of the constitution. Thus, the 1945 constitution was 
an elementary and, consequently, flexible construction, which was well 
suited to the dangerous times that were to follow. It was a piece of emer­
gency legislation, as Soekarno explicitly stated, which would be replaced 
by a better one as soon as circumstances permitted (Bahar et al. 1995:426).
The debate about a new constitution was resumed the following year, after 
the Dutch, with the help of the English, once more gained a foothold in 
Indonesia. In November 1946 the Linggarjati Agreement between The 
Netherlands and the Republic was drawn up (NIB VI:261-3, 753-8). Here 
the federal principle was accepted by both parties, and agreement was 
reached on a rough outline for a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Hereby 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands was to cooperate with a newly created 
sovereign state, the United States of Indonesia. As regards the constitution 
of this new state, it was agreed that this was something for the Indonesians 
to decide on; towards this end a constitutional assembly was to be formed 
as soon as possible. Nevertheless, some reservations were made with 
respect to the position of the Dutch. It was decided that The Netherlands 
would have a say in the composition of the constitutional assembly, while 
the constitution itself would have to be based on the principles of 
democracy and federalism. In addition, fundamental human rights as 
formulated in the United Nations Charter would be respected in both parts 
of the Union. Another important reservation was made with regard to the 
territorial boundaries of the new federation. Although it was accepted that 
in principle the territory of the USI would coincide with that of the former 
Netherlands East Indies, and a rough outline had been made of the compo­
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nent states, it remained to be seen whether the populations concerned 
would accept this arrangement:. For this reason special provisions were in­
troduced for populations of particular territories who might refuse to join 
the USI or the member state to which they had been provisionally 
assigned.
To the Dutch, these principles of 'self-determination1 and ‘minority 
rights' were very important, and not only for moral reasons. There were in­
dications that Christian minorities in Northeast Indonesia had strong 
reservations about separation from the Dutch Crown (Chauvel 1990:211 
ff.). Moreover, the Dutch indulged in the rather Machiavellian speculation 
that the populations of provinces which were then regarded as forming 
part of the Republic might opt for a different status once they were free to 
speak for themselves. In this way the overwhelming dominance of the 
Republic, which at that time had to be considered as covering Java, 
Sumatra and Madura, might be reduced to more modest proportions.
Afterthoughts and hidden agendas in the interpretation and implemen­
tation of the Linggarjati Agreement certainly were not the exclusive prero­
gative of the Dutch: this agreement was viewed by many, if not most, 
Republicans as a first step towards the extension of the Republic through­
out Indonesia. When further negotiations failed to make the agreement 
workable, the Dutch in mid-1947 resorted to force, launching their first 
military action (usually referred to in Dutch sources as Police Action). The 
Dutch army overran the most fertile and prosperous parts of Java and 
Sumatra, considerably reducing the territory of the Republic and facili­
tating the creation of a number of more or less pro-Dutch federalist states.
As was to be expected, these developments led to a standstill in the 
negotiations between The Netherlands and the Republic for a considerable 
time. By early 1948, however, relations had improved so much that it was 
possible for substantive discussions to resume, this time with the assistance 
of a Committee of Good Offices provided by the United Nations. In 
January 1948 an agreement was concluded aboard the American ship 
Renville in which the Republic accepted the territorial status quo and 
agreed to resume substantive negotiations on the basis of the Linggarjati 
principles (NIB XII:556-60, 847-54). The Renville Agreement contained no 
new elements relating to the content of the constitution.
The ensuing ‘post-Renville’ negotiations, which started on 12 February 
1948, were held alternately in Batavia and Kaliurang. Various committees 
and subcommittees were appointed to study the different aspects of the 
vast number o f conflicting views, The Dutch on 18 March 1948 presented 
a working-paper on the constitution (NIB XIII:222-3). In it, the earlier 
Dutch reservations on the subject were reiterated, though this time 
formulated as much as possible within the terms of the Renville Agreement. 
Furthermore, some comments on the division of tasks between the central 
government of the USI and the component states were added. A few days
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later the Republican committee, headed once again by Professor Supomo, 
succeeded in presenting a draft of its own containing the principal outlines 
of a constitution of the USI (.NIB XIII:276-9). Here, too, much attention 
was given to the division of powers between the central government and 
the component states. Moreover, democracy, the Pancasila, and minority 
rights were emphasized, while the protection of human rights as referred to 
in the United Nations Charter was added. In the general principles, much 
attention was given to the Indonesian national character of the new state.
As regards the governmental structure of the USI, this displayed marked 
deviations from the 1945 constitution of the Republic, The West European 
cabinet system was retained and was mote clearly defined than before. To 
enhance the federal character of the state, a bicameral system was pro­
posed. It provided for a senate composed of representatives of the member 
states on an equal basis and a house of representatives elected by the 
peoples of the several member states and representing these in proportion 
to their relative numerical strength. Both houses together were to form the 
legislative assembly, while the house of representatives by itself would be a 
parliament, to which the ministers were accountable. This was a mixture, in 
short, of the North American and Western European systems of govern­
ment. This was no accident, for during the negotiations leading up to the 
Renville Agreement the American member of the Committee of Good Offi­
ces Frank Graham had strongly advised the Republican delegation to use 
the Congress of the United States of America as a model capable of dealing 
with the federal features of the new state (see NIB XII:324, 455, 486).
This proposal was almost wholly acceptable to the Netherlands dele­
gation, too, with opinions differing on only a few remaining points (NIB 
XIII:426). Nevertheless, in conformity with the notion that the constitution 
was first and foremost a matter for the Indonesian people themselves to 
decide, which had been accepted at Linggarjati, a decision on these points 
was left to the projected constituent assembly. The points in question 
included the issue of the position of the Indonesian language vis-à-vis the 
regional languages and the denial of the right of secession to the member 
states. This latter point was on an especially uneasy footing with the 
Linggarjati articles regulating the right of secession of regional groups, so 
that the Dutch were probably only too pleased to refer this thorny problem 
to the constituent assembly.
Hence it can safely be stated that by the end of March 1948 the Dutch and 
Republican delegations had reached almost unanimous agreement on the 
outline of the constitution of the USI. That is not to say that the 
constituent assembly was able to meet at once and finish the job, however.
Apart from an outline of the constitution, other matters needed to be 
settled in the post-Renville negotations as well. A blueprint for a 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union had to be drawn up and a more precise 
method of delimiting the component states of the federation to be found.
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One of the most difficult problems to be solved was that of the relationship 
between the Netherlands Indies Government and the Republic in the 
interim period preceding the transfer of sovereignty. Both parties were 
constantly trying to outmanoeuvre each other and settle Indonesian affairs 
to their own advantage. In this connection the sequence of the various 
steps that needed to be taken was important.
The Dutch gave priority to an agreement about the Union that would 
link The Netherlands and Indonesia together in the post-independence 
period. Though acutely aware that the success of such a Union would 
depend upon the new rulers’ disposition towards them, they tried to 
safeguard their military pre-eminence for the next few years as well. The 
most attractive option for the Republicans was to organize the United 
States of Indonesia as soon as possible and with a dominant position in it 
for themselves. For this reason they were utterly averse to applying the 
agreed principle of plebiscites to define the extent of the component states 
in their own territory. Such a course not only was regarded as an insult, but 
also was precarious, as the outcome was deemed by no means certain (NIB 
XVI:670-98). According to the Republicans, a plebiscite had only been 
meant for the Dutch-occupied territories.
These and many other matters prevented agreement being reached, and 
accordingly the negotiations petered out round about the middle of 1948. 
In the meantime, The Netherlands stepped up its programme of 
strengthening its position by pushing non-Republican Indonesian groups 
into the foreground. This it did in a variety of ways, for instance by 
appointing as many Indonesians as possible to key positions in Dutch- 
controlled government bodies. Thus the formal leader of the Dutch 
delegation which had to negotiate the Renville Agreement was the 
Indonesian civil servant Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo. Much emphasis was 
placed upon the structure of the federation. Now that some of the newly 
created member states of the federation were becoming sufficiently strong, 
the time seemed to have come to use them effectively as a counterbalance 
to the Republic. In July 1948 a conference of representatives of these 
federated states was organized in Bandung* which was intended as a 
forerunner of the projected constituent assembly and as an opportunity for 
federal politicians to gain political experience. Even if it yielded no 
concrete results, the lessons in statesmanship would not be wasted, while a 
greater prominence of leading non-Republican Indonesian statesmen 
would actually strengthen the position of the Dutch (NIB XIII:518-21).
At the same time an Indies Government specialist, Professor K.L.J. 
Enthoven, set out to prepare a blueprint for an interim government that 
could take over the tasks of government in the period before the actual 
transfer of sovereignty. In his opinion, such an interim government might 
be formed with or without Republican participation. He subsequently 
drew up a plan whereby Indonesian heads of administrative departments 
were to function as ministers, assisted by Dutch technical advisers. This
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proposed interim government would occupy quite a strong position vis-à- 
vis The Hague. In it the highest Dutch authority in Indonesia would retain 
a prominent position, however, enabling him to continue to act as head of 
government (NIB XIV:386-95). Essentially, it was the boyhood dream of 
any governor-general of the past five decades or so.
In Dutch circles, opinions were divided about the consequences of a 
policy whereby one would proceed without first consulting the Republic. 
Some suggested that the Republic might be left out completely, and others 
that, once an interim government was established without the Republic, 
the latter would come round for fear of being by-passed. More down-to- 
earth minds foresaw, however, that a certain amount of force would be 
needed to get the Republic to accept such a course and join a Dutch-made 
interim government.
There were yet other options open, as was demonstrated by subsequent 
developments. Up until that point the Dutch attitude towards the leaders 
of the component states of the federation had been marked by a tinge of 
outright paternalism. It was expected that they would ultimately comply 
with the wishes of the Dutch as a last resort. They were certainly not 
expected to take the initiative. When they did, this caused a shock, the 
reverberations of which are still perceptible in the records of the period. 
Out of the large and rather unwieldy mass of delegates at the Bandung 
conference, a smaller committee consisting of the leaders of the twelve then 
existing federalist states had formed. It was styled ‘Bijeenkomst Federaal 
Overleg5 (Federal Consultative Committee), abbreviated as B.F.O. Its most 
prominent member was Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the Prime Minister of 
East Indonesia, which was by far the best organized of these states. The 
head of the Dutch administration in Indonesia, Lieutenant-Governor- 
General H.J. Van Mook, received a very unpleasant surprise when in July
1948 a B.F.O. Delegation led by Anak Agung paid him a visit and handed 
him an alternative proposal for an interim government to that put forward 
by Professor Enthoven (NIB XIV;375-83).
This particular proposal was presented in the form of a resolution, the so- 
called Bandung Resolution, Hereby the interim government was organized 
in such a way as to give Indonesians a maximal say in government affairs, 
although Netherlands sovereignty in the interim period was formally ac­
cepted. The remaining powers of the Dutch administration were to be de­
fined as precisely and narrowly as possible, however. For the rest, power 
was to be vested in an interim government comprising a small body of 
about three persons. This so-called ‘Directorium9 would appoint the heads 
of administrative departments and guide them. In conformity with Su- 
pomo’s March proposals, the Bandung Resolution also envisaged two re­
presentative bodies; a senate, consisting of the heads of the member states, 
and a representative council, whose members were to be appointed or 
elected by the populations of the respective states, proportional to their
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numerica] strength. The Directorium should always try and reach agree­
ment with the senate in matters relating to the federal state and defend its 
policies vis-a-vis the representative council. The council would not have 
the power to dismiss the Directorium, however, nor would the latter have 
the power to dissolve the council. In any conflict, the Directorium might 
overrule the council, provided it had the support of the senate.
These rather authoritarian features of the interim government conceived 
at the Bandung conference were defensible in view of the brief life span 
allotted it. For sovereignty was to be conferred on an independent United 
States of Indonesia as early as 1 January 1949. One of the interim 
government’s first tasks would be to appoint the constituent assembly that 
was to frame the definitive constitution. In the eyes of the proponents of 
the Bandung Resolution, this resolution already contained important 
elements of such a definitive constitution, however. So the Directorium, for 
instance, which was preferably to include a representative of the Republic, 
was envisaged as an instrument for integrating the Republic into the 
federal organization. As Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo explained to a still 
upset Van Mook, the Bandung Resolution was an original Indonesian 
piece of work, drawn up by a group of men who no longer believed that 
the Dutch and the Republicans would be able to come to an agreement 
without their active intervention. This was, in fact, true, as subsequent 
events were to demonstrate, Thus a third force had emerged, and from that 
moment Indonesian politics were more complicated than ever before, 
although the new situation at the same time offered greater opportunities 
for a solution of the problem of decolonization.
Van Mook, although upset by this initiative, which threatened to curb his 
own powers unduly within too short a time span, nevertheless could not 
do anything but take it seriously. For this reason he sent both Enthoven 
and a B.F.O. Delegation to Europe to put both proposals to the Dutch 
Cabinet for discussion. The result did not come up to his expectations. In 
The Netherlands, Anak Agung and his delegation won much sympathy for 
their ideas, so that consequently a resolution was drawn up which 
provided for an interim government roughly similar to that proposed by the 
Bandung Resolution. It was moreover decided that this resolution, the 
Besluit Bestuursvoering Indonesië in Overgangstijd (Resolution Apropos 
of the Administration of Indonesia in the Transitional Period), should be 
passed into law as soon as possible (NIB XV:291-4, 346-9).
The more assertive of the Bandung leaders now began to have high 
hopes that it would be their turn next to take the initiative and enter into 
negotiations with the Republic. For these leaders, the relationship with the 
Republic was a very ambivalent one, however. The Republic enjoyed the 
prestige of having taken the lead in the struggle for Indonesian 
independence. Moreover, back home in Macassar, Bandung, Surabaya, 
Palembang or Medan, strong pro-Republican groups were making their
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voices heard in the representative councils of their states. The Republic 
had its own army, what was more, the presence of which was felt daily in 
many parts of Indonesia. In point of fact, in the latter half of 1948, after the 
post-Renville negotiations reached an impasse, Republican-inspired 
guerrilla activities increased sharply in the Dutch-occupied parts of Java. 
Hence for the Federalists, the Republic was a dangerous negotiating 
partner, but would be an even more dangerous adversary. If the Dutch 
army could cut the Republic down to size, then all would be well, provided 
it did not disappear from the scene altogether. For in that eventuality the 
Federalists would have to tackle the Dutch by themselves, and they were 
by no means sure that independence would be achieved soon in that case. 
On the other hand, the prospect of a Dutch-Republican agreement was 
equally unattractive to the Federalists, since this would put them at the 
mercy of both and would further reduce their room for manoeuvre.
So it was with mixed feelings that the Federalists observed the Dutch 
Cabinet’s final attempt in October and November 1948 to negotiate an 
agreement with the Republic. This rather spoiled things for them. They 
were certainly not amused, for instance, when the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, D.U. Stikker, made no objections in a discussion with Hatta 
when the latter rejected the idea of a Directorium out of hand (NIB  
XV:580-3). Hatta subsequently, on 10 November, produced a memorandum 
proposing a new plan for an interim government (NIB XV;631-5). It 
displayed a number of marked deviations from the Republican March 
proposals for a definitive constitution and included some procedural details 
that had been removed from the lengthy proposals presented a few months 
earlier by the American member of the Committee of Good Offices, Merle 
Cochran (NIB XV:43-56), In Hatta’s proposal the interim period was 
divided into two phases. In the first phase there was to be a council of 
ministers at the head, which was to be assisted by a Federal council and a 
provisional representative body. The governments of both the member 
states of the federation and the Republic were to have a strong hand in the 
formation of these bodies. In practice, this would boil down to a system 
whereby the Republic and the B.F.O. would jointly govern the country 
under formal Dutch supervision. The composition of the Federal council 
differed greatly from that of the 'senate’ envisaged by either Supomo or 
the Bandung leaders, however. Instead of equal representation of the 
various member states, Hatta proposed that about a third of the members of 
this council should be appointed by the Republic. As for the definitive 
constituent assembly, he suggested that this body convene half a year after 
the installation of the interim government and that it be given far-reaching 
powers as a provisional parliament as well. One of its first tasks would be 
to nominate a President, who at that stage should come into office 
alongside the representative of the Dutch Crown during his final term.
The Dutch Government, after ample deliberation, rejected this proposal, 
since Hatta was not able or willing to guarantee a reduction of the
76 P.J. Drooglever
Republican Army (T,Ni. = Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and at the same 
time accept Dutch military pre-eminence in the interim period. It believed 
that in such a situation implementation of the scheme would prompt the 
defection of the Federalists and thus lead to immediate dominance of the 
Republic. Thereupon the Dutch launched a second large-scale military 
operation, and in the last days of December 1948 the whole of Java and 
parts of Sumatra were occupied and most members of the Republican 
Government were taken prisoner. Temporarily, the Republic seemed to 
have vanished from the face of earth. Yet it could still count on a great deal 
of support on both the national and an international level, while its army 
was able to intensify its guerrilla warfare and rally support from a large 
section of the population. Consequently, negotiations had to be resumed 
as early as the beginning of 1949. During the first phase of these 
negotiations, with Soekarno and Hatta in Dutch custody, the Federalists 
were in a relatively strong position and could afford to give themselves a 
considerable degree of leeway. So they voted on 3 March in favour of a 
resolution for recognition of the Republic as a state (NIB XVIII;28). This 
way they placed the Dutch before a fait accompli, thereby forcing them to 
do the same.
These developments following their second military action were teaching 
the Dutch that, whatever happened, they had to come to terms with the 
Republic and that it was up to the Republicans and Federalists themselves 
to decide upon the niceties of the modus vivendi between them. On 7 May
1949 the Dutch and Republican negotiators, J.H. van Roijen and Moh, 
Roem, made a number of statements that paved the way for more sub­
stantive discussions (NIB XVIIL596-8). A further agreement of 22 June laid 
down rules for the termination of the guerrilla warfare and for the return of 
the Republican Government to Yogyakarta. On the same occasion, 
definitive arrangements were made concerning the time and the conditions 
of a Round Table Conference to be held between all parties concerned in 
The Hague. This was intended ‘to bring about a just and lasting settlement 
of the Indonesian dispute* and to make possible a transfer of sovereignty 
to Indonesia before the end of the year. One of the items on the agenda for 
this conference was the drafting of a provisional constitution for the 
projected United States of Indonesia (NIB XIX: 128-42).
The qualification 'provisional’ needs some explanation. Up till the end 
of 1948, the implicit idea in all the proposals for a constituent assembly was 
that this body would have to finish its work in the interim period, that is to 
say, before the actual transfer of sovereignty took place. When 
negotiations were tentatively resumed in the first months of 1949, 
however, all parties concerned were eager to do business as soon as 
possible. Pressure from the Security Council certainly played a role here. 
For the Dutch and the Federalists the fact that at that time the Republic 
was still in a weak position provided an additional stimulus to speed things
The Genesis of the Indonesian Constitution 11
up, as it seemed attractive to them to come to an arrangement at this time of 
relative strength. For the captured Republican leaders, anxiety about being 
bypassed by the leaders of the on-going guerrilla war made it desirable to 
hasten a settlement. All parties were prepared to accept, therefore, that the 
agreements regulating the transfer of sovereignty would contain only some 
general guarantees with respect to the future state system and that the 
constituent assembly would convene at a later stage in an independent 
Indonesia (see NIB XVII:255-8, 365-71, 396-9).
For The Netherlands, solid agreements about a Netherlands-Indonesian 
Union and guarantees with respect to Dutch financial and humanitarian 
interests in Indonesia were gaining greater priority in this period. The 
Dutch now began to differentiate more clearly between Dutch and 
Indonesian interests than before. This gradual change of attitude was 
stimulated by the questionable results of their second military action. The 
Dutch in fact had played out most of their hand. For most Dutch politicians 
‘Restoration of Peace and Order’ had been a precondition for any decisive 
step towards Indonesian independence. By this time, however, the limited 
possibilities of achieving such a state of ‘Peace and Order’ of their own 
making had been felt more fully. Nevertheless, it was easier for them to 
accept the new reality of an impending decolonization as a result of the 
experiences of the past few years, which had demonstrated to them that 
the constitutional notions of the Federalists and the Republicans (Supomo) 
displayed no insurmountable mutual incompatibilities, and that any differ­
ences that remained had to be settled between these two parties them­
selves anyhow. Moreover, the Federalists, in making overtures to the 
Republic, were now clearly shouldering responsibilities that had hitherto 
rested exclusively on The Netherlands. Finally, as a look at the behaviour 
of the Dutch in this period suggests, their conquest of the Republican 
capital had given them the compensation they needed for the many 
humiliations they had suffered since the beginning of the war with Japan.
Whatever the Dutch motives, in March 1949 and after, it was publicly 
announced that the definitive constituent assembly would be convened 
after the transfer of sovereignty (see NIB XVIII:23-30 ff.). This did not 
relieve the parties concerned of the task of arranging for a provisional 
government to assume sovereignty, however. It was to be expected, 
moreover, that the structure of such a provisional government that was to 
guide Indonesia into independence would be prejudicial to the definitive 
structure of the state and its constitution.
Van Roijen and Roem, in their statements of 7 May 1949, stipulated the 
conditions for the return of the Republic to the core area of its former 
territory, Yogyakarta. Although the agreement was very vague regarding 
the extent of the territory of the restored Republic, it did state that the 
Republic was to occupy one third of the seats in a provisional 
representative council of the United States of Indonesia as a whole. This 
was the same proportion as that mentioned in the Cochran Note and in the
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Hatta memorandum of November 1948. Thus it is evident from these 
provisions in the Van Roijen-Roem Agreement that the Republic was 
making a comeback, or at least was returning to the position it had 
occupied before the second Dutch military action. Once The Netherlands 
made it clear that they were going to withdraw anyway, the Republican 
star began to rise fast in Indonesia. That of the Federalists, which had never 
risen to a high position in the firmament to begin with, began to decline 
proportionately.
This development is clearly demonstrated by the final phase of the 
constitutional debate that took place under colonial rule. In January 1949, 
at a point when the Republican star was at its palest, Anak Agung urged 
renewed contact between Federalists and Republicans. In April, when the 
negotiations between The Netherlands and the Republic had barely 
resumed, he proposed that a pan-Indonesian conference be held as soon as 
possible after the conclusion of the negotiations (NIB XVIIP.391-3). At 
such a conference, Federalists and Republicans might try to solve the 
Indonesian conundrum among themselves, without the Dutch dictating the 
agenda. Indeed, on 7 May -  the very same day that Van Roijen and Roem 
made their statements -  a committee was set up by the B.F.O. in Bandung 
(NIB XIX:278, note 4) and charged with the task o f preparing the 
working-papers for the pan-Indonesian conference, which did, in fact, take 
place at the end of July 1949 (NIB XIX:267~8, 277-81, 347-53, 356-9, 432- 
41).
From the reports of the discussions at this conference5 it is obvious that 
Anak Agung, and with him the majority of the Federalist leaders, were 
certainly not out after a complete restoration of the Republic. Nevertheless, 
that was in fact what was happening, and they themselves were instru­
mental in the process. After the return of Soekarno and Hatta to Yogya, 
Republican prestige was so high that even the staunchest Federalist 
supporters, as Anak Agung undoubtedly was, had the greatest of difficulty 
in holding their ground when confronted with the Republicans’ wishes. 
For instance, whereas Anak Agung had preferred Batavia as the place of 
the conference, at a mere snap of the fingers of the Republicans the 
opening ceremonies were held in Yogyakarta, where the Republicans 
would have the full advantage of their moral superiority. Here the federal 
visitors were greeted by bands of youths welcoming them at the railway 
station with the Merdeka slogans of the Republic. Inside the conference 
room the same mood prevailed. A Republican proposal that the Republic 
should return to the territory it had possessed before the second Dutch 
military action was passed without demur. The Sumatran delegates who 
had earlier advocated the creation of new federalist states on their island in
? See also A.R.A., archief A.S. 2389, and A.R.A., archief VIeer no. 118.
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the strongest of terms did not even dare to raise their voices in defence of 
this. A further example of Republican arrogance and Federalist weakness is 
furnished by Supomo, at the end of a long discussion on an unrelated 
subject, flinging a small note on the table with the casual remark that he 
supposed that the gentlemen would agree with its contents, and their 
doing so without a word. The note contained the proposal, however, that 
the projected United States of Indonesia should accept its sovereignty not 
only from The Netherlands but also from the Republic. With this gesture -  
or lack of a gesture -  the Federalist statesmen recognized a Republican 
claim to sovereignty which, though until then put forward with great 
persistence, had not met with acknowledgement in any agreement signed 
by the Dutch. A third and most decisive victory scored by the Republic at 
the pan-Indonesian conference was the acceptance of the Republican 
Army, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (T.N.I.), as the core of the army of the 
United States of Indonesia. The demand for this had been put forward a 
year previously by the Republican Army commander, General Sudirman, in 
a widely publicized statement (NIB XIV;10, 11; XVI:667-8) and had 
blocked Dutch-Indonesian agreement during the post-Renville 
negotiations. By giving in on this essential point, the Federalists prevented 
the development of a more evenly balanced army in which the already 
existing federal troops and the Indonesian members of the Royal 
Netherlands Indies Army (R.N.I.A.) would occupy a stronger position. 
Now the door was open to a wholly T,N.I.-dominated federal army. 
Obviously not all the Federalist statesmen were fully aware of what they 
were doing at the time. Months later, even as late as after the end of the 
Round Table Conference, quite a few of them still believed that they 
would be able to retain segments of the R.N.I.A. as the army of their own 
state. It was not a self-delusion in which Anak Agung was inclined to 
indulge, however. After all, in the light of the existing power relations in 
Indonesia and the explicit intention of the Dutch to withdraw their troops, 
no other option was open at that time. Giving in wholeheartedly to reality 
surely was the wisest thing to do.
It was probably these Federalist concessions on the points o f prestige 
and power that increased the possibilities of agreement being reached on 
the subject of a constitution. To begin with, both parties had prepared 
themselves thoroughly for this item on the pan-Indonesian conference 
agenda. As was mentioned above, the B.F.O. had already set up a com­
mittee on 7 May 1949 to prepare the necessary drafts. This committee, 
though chaired by a leading B.F.O. politician, was not a purely Indonesian 
affair. Four of its six members were Dutch officials, who had obviously 
been chosen for their technical skills. The results of its activities as 
recorded in a detailed report were completely in line on all essential points 
with earlier ventilated B.F.O. ideas, however, and its recommendations 
were accepted after discussion at a plenary B.F.O. meeting. In these 
recommendations once again the concept of a ‘core cabinet5 figured
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prominently, which, on the whole, tended to safeguard the strong position 
of the governments of the component states in the conduct of the affairs of 
the United States of Indonesia.
The Republic for its part entered the pan-Indonesian conference with 
rather a lengthy document setting out the newest variant of the ‘draft 
constitution’ drawn up by Supomo. It stuck to the idea of the earlier 
March and November 1948 proposals of vesting the supreme authority in a 
President as chief of state, who was not personally accountable, while the 
actual power was wielded by a cabinet accountable to a parliament and a 
senate. As far as the senate was concerned, these proposals signified a 
return to the March draft, as the component states would once again have 
equal representation. In accordance with the provision of the Van Roijen- 
Roem Agreement, the Republic claimed a third of the seats in the house of 
representatives.
Most Republican claims were more or less compatible with the B.F.O. 
proposals, as was to be expected, since the ideas of each side had long 
been known to the other. Moreover, the Republican leaders, especially 
Hatta, had discussed the Federalist proposals with an open mind at the 
pan-Indonesian conference. Though the final draft of the conference 
document on the constitution retained many of the wordings of the 
Republican proposal, it also contained Federalist amendments on many 
trivial and some essential points. As regards the senate, for instance, the 
respective starting positions had by no means been the same, as the 
Republic had proposed giving this federal organ ‘par excellence’ only 
advisory powers, while the B.F.O, had asked for full legislative powers for 
it. After much debate a compromise was reached whereby the B.F.O. 
demands were met in essence: the senate was to have legislative powers in 
all matters pertaining to the member states of the federation or to the 
relations between these states and the central government. Moreover, an 
ingenious set of rules governing the conditions under which the house of 
representatives could overrule the senate was negotiated.
A compromise was also reached on the core cabinet. Here, too, many 
elements of the original B.F.O. proposals were retained. As for the 
formation of a new government, a group of three persons was to be 
charged with this task by the President. This triumvirate offormatur was to 
be appointed in consultation with the leaders of all the component states, 
however. Once constituted, a small group of ministers within the cabinet 
would have final authority under certain circumstances. This group was to 
include the three original formatur. Though not a watertight construction, 
it nevertheless promised to give the member states a strong hand in the 
formation of the future central government.
In August 1949, a few weeks after the end of the pan-Indonesian 
conference, delegations from the Republic and from the B.F.O. travelled to 
The Netherlands for the Round Table Conference. Here attempts had to be
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made to find answers to the many questions regarding relations between 
Indonesia and The Netherlands which had until then remained unsolved. 
One of the things that also remained still to be done was the drafting of the 
provisional constitution, which was to be added to the package of treaties 
that would make the transfer of sovereignty possible.
The constitution finally agreed on was in close conformity with the 
agreement that had been reached between Republicans and B.F.O. 
members at the pan-Indonesian conference. As had been decided at 
Linggarjati, the discussions on the subject were a purely Indonesian affair. 
As a result, no records of these discussions are available in Dutch archives. 
Only on a few occasions were Dutch experts asked for advice. From the 
scant information that has filtered through it is evident that an active part 
was taken in the debates by Supomo, Yamin, Hatta and Anak Agung. Only 
when the complete text of the constitution was ready was it discussed 
with the Dutch delegation to check its consistency with other elements of 
the Round Table Agreements. These discussions went quite smoothly, as 
no flaws could be detected by the sharp eyes of the Dutch delegates on 
the subjects of democracy and federalism (NIB XX: nos 87, 173, 212, 256). 
It was only with regard to the safeguarding of that other fruit of the 
Linggarjati Agreement, the right of self-determination for parts of 
Indonesia, that problems arose. Indonesians of all walks o f life were 
decidedly opposed to granting this right. On the Dutch side feelings were 
mixed, however. All hope of being able to use this possibility as a means of 
whittling down the power of the Republic within the federation had been 
given up by this time. In fact, under the circumstances prevailing in 
Indonesia at that time it was to be feared that this expedient might easily 
be turned against the other member states of the federation. Nevertheless, 
the Dutch delegation had to put on at least a show of support for the idea, 
as some minority groups in Indonesia were determined to keep the Dutch 
to their word and had joined hands with rather pronounced right-wing 
groups in the Dutch Parliament. The end result was an arrangement which 
made it possible in theory to appeal to the right of self-determination, but 
on conditions which in practice made success highly unlikely (NIB XX: no. 
207 ff.).
Thus the constitution whereby the United States of Indonesia gained its 
independence on 27 December 1949 took shape. Dr. Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, in his inspiring study on the Indonesian ‘Konstituante* between 
1956 and 1959, only mentions this 1949 constitution in passing. However, 
in qualifying it as a constitution ‘drafted under the shadow of the Round 
Table Conference’, ‘made under foreign pressure’, and bearing the stamp 
of the ‘Colonialists' (Nasution 1992:27, 28), he does not do full justice to 
the facts. Of course, it was the Dutch who stimulated the federalist idea to a 
point where it was bound to overreach itself. Even so, as is evident already 
from the discussions of the 1945 PPKI, the federalist idea was not wholly 
alien to Indonesian political thinking at the time. And the events and
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discussions outlined in this paper demonstrate that a small federalist elite, 
drawn mostly from the outer provinces of Indonesia, between 1945 and
1950 could at least agree to its application to practical politics in a creative
way.
The same is true of the approach to the idea of democracy of the 
Indonesian elite of the time. Since the publication of H. Feith’s Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia in 1962, a consensus seems to 
have grown among historians and politicians that democracy as a Western 
concept is wholly alien to the Indonesian way of thinking and Indonesian 
society. Buyung Nasution should certainly be applauded for making a 
frontal assault on this theory. Nevertheless, his criticism of the 1949 
constitution in this respect is unjustified. From the debates leading up to 
the drafting of this constitution as well it is clear that an unqualified 
conception of democracy was present in political thinking among both 
prominent Federalists and Republicans, The Republican Prime Minister 
Hatta, at least, was quite outspoken in this connection. At the pan- 
Indonesian conference, for instance, he emphatically argued that only 
through democratic government could Indonesia achieve steady progress 
and prosperity. He even went a step further in linking democracy to 
federalism by describing the latter as an expression of the former.
Though restrained by their respective positions in the power game that 
was played at the time, Federalists and Republicans alike not only paid lip 
service to the notion of democracy in all the views they put forward, but 
also translated the idea into practical proposals. Buyung Nasution seems to 
be right in saying that the 1949 constitution displayed a marked shortage 
of democratic principles where it stipulated that ‘the government could not 
be toppled by parliament and parliament could not be dissolved by the 
President* (Nasution 1992:28). This statement should even so be dismissed 
as a misrepresentation of the facts, since this stipulation only applied to the 
first parliament, which had to be appointed in haste because the transfer of 
sovereignty was imminent. Its elected successor was to have full 
parliamentary powers. On the whole, the debates and the constitution gave 
full scope to the idea of democracy, which was no longer qualified in any 
sense as in the case of the latter5 s 1945 predecessor. In the discussions 
about this constitution, Supomo for his part did not fall back on the 
integralistic ideas advocated by him earlier/1
Finally, it is obvious that the atmosphere in which these discussions 
took place was largely conditioned by the presence of the Dutch and, in a 
wider sense, by the political and ideological controversies of the Cold War. 
The position of the Dutch was confused enough, since they now felt
6  This observation was corroborated by Dr. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung in a 
discussion with the author of the present article in October 1994. In the early fifties 
Supomo again fell to criticizing what he saw as the Western concept of Democracy, 
however, See Feith 1962:327.
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obliged to promote the same principles of democratic government which 
they had deemed of only limited relevance for Indonesia in the pre-war 
period. Even so, their insistence (and that of the Americans) on democratic 
procedures influenced the thinking of the participants in the post-1945 
constitutional debates. Moreover, the leading Indonesian politicians taking 
part in this debate had studied the Dutch handbooks on constitutional law 
in their youth as students either in The Netherlands or at the Batavia Law 
School. They had also been influenced by the presence of the Japanese in 
1942-1945. The constitutions of 1945 and 1949/50 were the products of 
fairly free and open discussions by Indonesians among themselves. 
Nevertheless, in both cases the context is reflected in the results. This fact 
reminds us once again of the risks involved in attempts to draw lessons 
from history. Obviously, World War II Japanese authoritarianism and post­
war democratic ideals both appealed to the Indonesian mind, which 
showed a capacity for handling both. This capacity was moreover evinced 
by roughly the same persons all the time. It is better not to generalize about 
any natural propensity of Indonesians, Asians, or anyone else, for any 
particular system of government, therefore, but rather to look at the 
political priorities and possibilities* The reinterpretation of the constitution 
in November 1945 served to widen the circle of those involved in the bid 
for power in the nascent Republican state and to make this constitution 
acceptable to the Allies. Much of the constitutional debate of the ensuing 
four years should be interpreted in the light of the contest for dominance 
between the Dutch, the mainly Java-based Republicans, and the Federalists 
from the other parts of Indonesia. From the records of the debates it is clear, 
however, that for most participants nationalism overrode all other consider­
ations. Both constitutions were regarded as provisional ones by their 
authors, hence as being open to change according to the needs of times to 
come. So the short-lived constitution of 1949 marked not the end but only 
the beginning of a discussion.
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